{"id":155,"date":"2013-11-20T20:06:55","date_gmt":"2013-11-20T20:06:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/localhost\/tobaccoexhibits\/?page_id=155"},"modified":"2014-04-09T10:45:50","modified_gmt":"2014-04-09T15:45:50","slug":"1980-1999-cigarette-marketers-try-to-hold-on","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/tobaccoexhibits.musc.edu\/?page_id=155","title":{"rendered":"1980 – 1999 Cigarette Marketers Try to Hold On"},"content":{"rendered":"

1980: Horace Kornegay<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Horace Kornegay, President of the TI boasted that: \u201cThe Surgeon General\u2019s media event was preempted by an Institute first-strike news conference. For the first time in the history of the cigarette controversy, a Secretary of HEW had to share the spotlight. In fact, we won top billing that night on all networks.\u201d
\nHorace Kornegay 1980 Annual Meeting Speech<\/a><\/h5>\n
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1980-1983: Nicotine Mastery and Addiction Denial<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\"vic-denoble-21\"<\/a><\/td>\n\n
In the early 1980s Philip Morris conducted a very sophisticated and expensive series of experiments designed to (1) synthesize new forms of nicotine with sufficient addictive properties to reinforce cigarette smoking and (2) to use laboratory animal experiments to measure the physiological effects of nicotine. Researchers Victor DeNoble and Paul Mele managed the complex endeavor.<\/h5>\n
The experiments produced substantial data and answered some questions about nicotine. Synthetic nicotine was developed that fit the desired specification. But, the response of the animals to nicotine was distressing to Philip Morris. The rats had demonstrated \u2018tolerance\u2019 to nicotine, an outcome too closely related to the definition of addiction for the comfort of a cigarette company accustomed to denying that nicotine was addictive. The results were so adverse that P.M. was advised by legal counsel to immediately terminate nicotine research on animals.
\n\u201cDespite the authors\u2019 [DeNoble, Mele] position regarding the apparent lack of physiological dependence, their overall results are extremely unfavorable.\u201d The laboratory was closed within days and Drs. DeNoble and Mele were forbidden to publish findings from their research.<\/h5>\n
Patrick Sirridge Shook Hardy & Bacon lawyer wrote to his counterpart at Philip Morris on July 27, 1983: \u201cIt is obvious that such a report has undesirable implications for smoking and health litigation. Tolerance is frequently cited as one of the hallmarks of addiction.\u201d
\n\u201cIn the final analysis, the performing and publishing of nicotine related research clearly seems ill advised from a litigation point of view.\u201d<\/h5>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
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1984: R.J. Reynolds Public Issues Campaign<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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The TI Cigarette Controversy White Papers end in 1984, so R.J. Reynolds launches its own campaign, called the \u201cOpen Debate\u201d that questions the link between smoking and disease.<\/h5>\n

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R.J. Reynolds Chairman, Edward A Horrigan, Jr.<\/p><\/div><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

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Replacement Smokers<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Once the number one brand nationwide, R.J. Reynolds\u2019 Winston was surpassed by Marlboro in 1975.\u00a0 By 1985, Philip Morris was selling well over twice as many Marlboros as Reynolds was selling Winston.<\/h5>\n
It occurred to Reynolds management that it would be a good move to reposition Camel against Marlboro and abandon Winston, and it did. February 1, 1985 the R.J.R. marketing department wrote:<\/h5>\n
\u201cThese ads were well received due to the fun\/humor aspects of the cartoons. More than any other theme, the \u201cFrench Camels\u201d appeared to attract the respondents\u2019 attention. The main drawbacks of these executions were that . . . they may be more appealing to an even younger age group . . .\u201d<\/h5>\n
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Youth Marketing<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n
\"american-children-tv-morning-shows\"<\/a><\/td>\n\n
\u201cI believe the advantages in morning television advertising are threefold. (1) It is noncompetitive or nearly so. (2) It delivers the message to the housewife at the best possible time \u2014 and to her children. (3) The morning television pitchman (or woman) would seem to be much more effective from my observations than his (or her) night-time counterpart.\u201d<\/h5>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
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\u00a0\u201cThere follows a listing of possible ways to counteract the anti-cigarette propaganda among young people who will\u00a0shortly enter the important 18-25 age group<\/big><\/big>. a) Direct refutation of anti-cigarette claims. b) Affirmative material on the place of tobacco in American life. c) The suitability of tobacco as a \u2018case study\u2019 in American history suggests a further exploitation of this means of creating a favorable image of tobacco among the young.\u201d<\/h5>\n<\/td>\n
\u00a0\"smoking-tradition\"<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0\"rjr-youngest-smokers\"<\/a><\/td>\n\n
\u00a0\u201cThey represent tomorrow\u2019s cigarette business.\u00a0 As this 14-24 age group matures, they will account for a key share of the total cigarette volume \u2014 for at least the next 25 years.\u201d<\/h5>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
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1981: Superman 2 – Marlboro Product Placement<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Philip Morris paid the producers of Superman 2 43,000 dollars to use the Marlboro logo on billboards and delivery trucks in the movie.<\/h5>\n
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Joe Camel<\/strong><\/h3>\n
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1987: Tobacco Institute Focuses on Secondhand Smoke<\/strong><\/h3>\n
In response to the landslide of public sentiment against social acceptability of smoking the industry turned its attention away from the primary issue, disease among smokers, to the second issue, Environmental Tobacco Smoke, also known as Second Hand Smoke.<\/h5>\n
This memo makes it clear the cigarette companies did not want the general public to know they were sponsoring another doubt machine, this one on the topic of public smoking. September 4, 1987 Center for Indoor Air Research memo on accounting procedure. \u00a0\u201dIf Institute [Tobacco Institute] staff or outside counsel mandates material changes in these assumptions in order to make the C.I.A.R. appear more separate from The Institute, additional accounting office staff may be required to handle C.I.A.R. accounting and administration.\u201d<\/h5>\n
\u201cThe Center will be located in Washington, D.C. but not in the same building as The Institute.\u00a0 All equipment\/ furniture on the premises will be the property of the Tobacco Institute and will be included on The Institute\u2019s property tax return.\u201d<\/h5>\n
On April 25, 1988, top Philip Morris scientist Tom Osdene writes the Tobacco Institute President Chilcote, \u00a0\u201cI think many of us have conceptualized the E.T.S. issue as a battlefield in which the arena is dominated by public relations and legal issues while the ammunition which is used happens to be science.\u00a0 It has been the purpose of C.I.A.R. as well as its precursor, the E.T.S. Advisory Committee, to provide ammunition in this fight.\u00a0 I believe the most important issue one needs to examine is the role that science can play in this major controversy.\u201d<\/h5>\n
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1994: Congressional Hearings<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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1984 The Cigarette Controversy: Why More Research if Needed.\u00a0\u00a0 A review by The Tobacco Institute of recent medical and scientific evidence presented to United States congressional committees. The text of this pamphlet demonstrates that the cigarette industry never abandoned its essential technique for promoting cigarette smoking in the face of medical evidence on the dangers of tobacco \u2026 \u201cto create doubt\u00a0 about the health charge with actually denying it.\u201d<\/h5>\n
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    \u00a0 \u201cThere were basic flaws in the methods used in the major epidemiological surveys that\u00a0cast doubt<\/strong>\u00a0on the accuracy of the claimed correlations.<\/h5>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
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      \u00a0 Because they made their own decisions about smoking they constitute \u2018self-selected\u2019 samples.\u00a0 Both these and other factors can bias an epidemiological study and\u00a0cast doubt<\/strong>\u00a0on its conclusions.<\/h5>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
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        \u00a0 Persistent errors in diagnosis of lung cancer as recorded on death certificates continue to\u00a0cast doubt<\/strong>\u00a0on the validity of statistical correlations in epidemiological studies and of claimed mortality patterns and trends.\u201d<\/h5>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
        \u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014<\/h5>\n
        From a Philip Morris press release April 14, 1994.\u00a0 In response to allegations made before Hon. Henry Waxman\u2019s investigative committee P.M. wrote:<\/h5>\n
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          \u00a0 Fact: Philip Morris does not believe that cigarettes are addictive.<\/h5>\n<\/li>\n
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          \u00a0 Fact: Philip Morris does not \u201cmanipulate\u201d nicotine levels.<\/h5>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/td>\n
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Phillip Morris Admits<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\"19990000_-pm-original-website3\"<\/a><\/td>\n\u00a0In 1999, only five years later Philip Morris admitted on its new web site that \u201cCigarette smoking is addictive, as that term is most commonly used today.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
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<< 1960 – 1979 Lawyers Run the Show<\/a><\/h2>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

1980: Horace Kornegay Horace Kornegay, President of the TI boasted that: \u201cThe Surgeon General\u2019s media event was preempted by an Institute first-strike news conference. For the first time in the history of the cigarette controversy, a Secretary of HEW had to share the spotlight. In fact, we won top billing that night on all networks.\u201d […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"parent":51,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","template":"template-onecolumn.php","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tobaccoexhibits.musc.edu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/155"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tobaccoexhibits.musc.edu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tobaccoexhibits.musc.edu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tobaccoexhibits.musc.edu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tobaccoexhibits.musc.edu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=155"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/tobaccoexhibits.musc.edu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/155\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tobaccoexhibits.musc.edu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/51"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tobaccoexhibits.musc.edu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=155"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}